<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>IteratedPrisonersDilemma on behaviorengineering.ai</title><link>https://behaviorengineering.ai/tags/iteratedprisonersdilemma/</link><description>Recent content in IteratedPrisonersDilemma on behaviorengineering.ai</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 01:00:00 +1100</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://behaviorengineering.ai/tags/iteratedprisonersdilemma/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Prisoner's Dilemma, Tit for Tat, and how cooperation scales</title><link>https://behaviorengineering.ai/social-protocols/2026-04-26-prisoner-dilemma-tit-for-tat/</link><pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 01:00:00 +1100</pubDate><guid>https://behaviorengineering.ai/social-protocols/2026-04-26-prisoner-dilemma-tit-for-tat/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="the-takeaway"&gt;The Takeaway&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The tournament proves that you don&amp;rsquo;t need a central authority or pure altruism to get cooperation. You just need &lt;strong&gt;repetition&lt;/strong&gt; and the right &lt;strong&gt;incentives&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a world that looks like a zero-sum fight, the winning move is often to be &lt;strong&gt;clear&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;fair&lt;/strong&gt;, and &lt;strong&gt;not a pushover&lt;/strong&gt;. This combination acts as a defense against exploitation: it allows collaboration to flourish while making &amp;ldquo;nasty&amp;rdquo; or parasitic strategies too expensive to maintain.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>